In the age of the large-scale collecton, aggregaton, and analysis of personal data ('Big Data'), merchants can generate complex profles of consumers. Based on those profles, algorithms can then try and match customers with the highest price they are willing to pay. But this entails the risk that pricing algorithms rely on certain personal characteristcs of individuals that are protected under both data protecton and ant-discriminaton law. For instance, relying on the user's ethnic origin to determine pricing may trigger the special protecton foreseen for sensitve personal data and the prohibiton of discriminaton in access to goods and services. Focusing on European Union law, this artcle seeks to answer the following queston: What protecton do data protecton law and ant-discriminaton law provide for individuals against discriminatory pricing decisions taken by algorithms? Its originality resides in an analysis that combines the approaches of these two disciplines, presentng the commonalites, advantages from an integrated approach, and misalignments currently existng at the intersecton of EU data protecton and ant-discriminaton law.
Introducton
It is no secret that diferent users are regularly shown diferent prices online. Algorithms determining these prices are ubiquitous in the online environment, where merchants are able to process unprecedented amounts of personal data and generate complex profles of consumers. Pricing decisions can have a real impact on human lives, for instance when they concern credit applicatons, insurance premiums, or mortgage loans, and afect the ability of individuals to partcipate economically in our society. However, due to the opacity of algorithms, it is not clear on what basis prices are set for diferent individuals. There is an obvious risk that these pricing decisions are ultmately based on grounds which ant-discriminaton law prohibits, like ethnic origin or gender.
From a legal scholar's point of view, the core queston regarding potentally discriminatory pricing algorithms is whether the law provides any protecton or remedies. Although the issue of 'price discriminaton' via algorithms has been dealt with in academic literature from the standpoint of how these algorithms are designed and in relaton to the General Data Protecton Regulaton (GDPR), an enquiry into how ant-discriminaton law specifcally interacts with data protecton law in this context remains crucial to understand how individuals are protected in their access to goods and services. This is partcularly relevant in the European Union (EU) context, where both data protecton and non-discriminaton are considered fundamental rights.
In this artcle we set out to answer the following core queston: What protecton does EU data protecton and ant-discriminaton law currently provide against discriminatory pricing algorithms? In a frst step, we establish what kind of protecton EU data protecton law and EU antdiscriminaton law ofer separately in this regard. Taking our analysis further, we elaborate on the commonalites, potental advantages of an integrated approach, and misalignments arising at the intersecton of data protecton and non-discriminaton. To conclude our artcle, we bundle our arguments together and consider the broader implicatons of the interacton between these two felds of law through the example of pricing algorithms.
While we will look at the legal protecton against discriminatory pricing algorithms from the perspectve of EU data protecton law and EU ant-discriminaton law, a third area of EU law, namely EU consumer protecton law,[3] might also be of relevance as it ofers tools to protect against the imbalance between merchants and individuals, ranging from enhanced transparency (e.g. pre-contractual informaton obligatons or requirements for price indicatons)[4] to contractual remedies addressing non-conformity of an acquired good or service with the contract. [5] However, an in-depth analysis of the interrelaton between EU consumer protecton law and discriminatory pricing algorithms would exceed the scope of this artcle and will therefore not be discussed here. [6] 1.1 Preliminary remarks: Price discriminaton and algorithms
The term 'price discriminaton' is regularly used in diferent contexts. From an economic point of view, the concept describes the process of matching customers with the highest price they are willing to pay. [7] It is pricing a product in a way that takes the personal atributes of the potental customer into account. [8] From that economic perspectve, price discriminaton is desirable insofar as it creates a beter match between ofer and demand, which could potentally be benefcial for the aggregated welfare. [9] In the feld of competton law, pricing discriminaton is used to explore the exploitatve, distortonary, or exclusionary efects of certain commercial practces: price discriminaton can be part of collusion or price fxing, and hence antcompettve and a distorton for the market. [10] 2. Applicability of data protecton law to pricing algorithms Within the EU, several data protecton instruments ensure that the processing of personal dataalso by pricing algorithms-must be fair, lawful and transparent. These instruments are, in a nonlaw enforcement context, [24] the GDPR (applicable from 25 May 2018, succeeding the Data Protecton Directve (DPD)) [25] and the e-Privacy Directve (EPD). [26] To assess whether these instruments have any relevance for questons concerning pricing algorithms and discriminaton, it is frst necessary to establish the applicability of EU data protecton law in general. The two key concepts for such applicability are 'personal data' and 'processing of personal data'. The concept of 'personal data' in EU data protecton law was frstly defned in Artcle 2(a) DPD and has been clarifed in Artcle 4(1) GDPR. It includes any informaton with which someone can either be directly identfed or become identfable. According to the Artcle 29 Working Party (WP29), an important role in this context is played by 'identfers', which are informaton that can render a person identfable, such as a name or an IP address. [27] In general, identfability is context-dependent. [28] In Breyer the Court of Justce of the European Union (CJEU) considered dynamic IP addresses personal data, since for the partcular controller in that case (an online media service provider) it would have been possible to identfy the person behind them. [29] Thus, the concept of personal data has a very broad scope and it maters which resources a controller theoretcally has at his or her disposal. [30] It has been argued that decisions made by (pricing) algorithms could potentally fall outside the scope of EU data protecton law if anonymous data are used. [31] While it is conceivable that some algorithms may rely solely on anonymous data and produce decisions that cannot be linked to an identfed individual (e.g. identfcaton via keystroke dynamics), [32] this is usually not the case with pricing algorithms, which operate based on profles. [33] Considering that these profles ofen include informaton like IP addresses, locaton, or device fngerprints, we believe it safe to assume that they will normally resort to personal data to some extent in order to arrive at their pricing result. [34] Hence, we argue that the frst conditon for the applicability of EU data protecton law seems to be fulflled for pricing algorithms.
The concept of 'processing of personal data' is equally broad. According to Artcle 4(2) GDPR it means 'any operaton or set of operatons which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collecton, recording, organisaton, structuring, storage, adaptaton or alteraton or otherwise making available, alignment or combinaton, restricton, erasure or destructon'. Processing performed by a pricing algorithm will usually fall within this defniton, as it includes collecton of data from as many sources as possible, analysis of such data, and the making available of the result of the analysis in the form of a price. [35] Therefore the second element for the applicability of EU data protecton law is also fulflled. [36] Regarding the territorial and material scope of EU data protecton law, regulated in Artcle 3 GDPR, it sufces that the establishment of the controller or the processor is within the EU and that the actvity falls within Union law. [37] Territoriality is also fulflled if a EU subject is targeted or is monitored. [38] Considering that pricing algorithms operate when goods and services are requested, the GDPR will almost always apply if a EU data subject is concerned, regardless of the establishment of the controller. [39] The fact that EU data protecton law applies in principle to pricing algorithms does not mean that it prohibits per se such algorithms. [40] In general, EU data protecton law does not provide an ex ante choice to individuals about whether or not they want their data to be processed (in some cases, data subject rights give the possibility to object to the processing or to delete some results of processing ex post).
[41] The only excepton is the choice whether or not to consent in cases where the lawful basis for the processing is individual consent (which is only one out of six legal bases enumerated in Artcle 6 GDPR).
[42] Additonally, even in consent situatons, the individual cannot choose who is allowed to process their personal data once consent is given if the processing is covered by the original purpose of collecton. [43] The processing of data in pricing algorithms can thus be perfectly legitmate, as long as the GDPR and potentally other secondary EU legislatve norms regarding data protecton are complied with.
The applicability of EU data protecton law with regard to pricing algorithms results in the applicability of EU data protecton principles, now neatly enumerated in Artcle 5(1) GDPR. These principles include inter alia the requirements of transparency and fairness, which are relevant for the use of algorithms and for concerns about discriminaton. The principle of transparency is especially important for pricing algorithms. [44] Transparency means that data subjects must be in a positon to understand how their actons infuence the results of the algorithm. In other words, they must be informed about the basic logic behind the workings of the algorithm. [45] The principle of transparency also demands that data subjects be aware of the personal data collected about them and that they be able correct inaccurate data. [46] The principle of fairness has a less clear scope, even though it is a fundamental principle of the GDPR and data protecton in general. [47] According to Cliford and Ausloos the principle overarches the GDPR and encompasses many aspects, ranging from transparency to protecton from power imbalances, and it can be summarised in the concepts of fair balancing and procedural fairness. [48] Considering the mere applicability of data protecton law to pricing algorithms, this secton concludes that data protecton law is indeed applicable to pricing algorithms, but does not prohibit them as such.
3. Applicability of ant-discriminaton law to pricing algorithms Pricing decisions taken by algorithms can be problematc from an ant-discriminaton law perspectve. By determining the monetary costs that individuals have to bear to obtain a partcular good or service, pricing decisions have an impact on the access of individuals to the market. According to ant-discriminaton law, this access cannot be made dependent, generally speaking, upon certain characteristcs such as racial or ethnic origin, gender, disability, sexual orientaton, age, etc. Consequently, if an algorithm takes any of these factors into account to make a pricing decision that is then presented to an individual, that decision may be considered discriminatory and therefore be prohibited.
Some examples may help further illustrate this point. For instance, an individual living near a mosque and who regularly consumes halal products or books in Arabic could be categorised by an algorithm as belonging to an ethnic minority and potentally be ofered diferent pricing from that of the ethnic majority. An applicant for a mortgage loan may experience higher interest rates because they live in a neighbourhood mostly inhabited by people of a partcular ethnic origin, independently of whether the applicant belongs to that group or not. A young woman may face higher insurance premiums for health care on the basis of her gender and age, since the algorithm may take into account the higher costs usually associated with pregnancy.
Under EU law, the noton of access to goods and services has been interpreted in a large sense, as covering a wide range of actvites ranging from banking, insurance, transport, or travel services to the business operaton of cinemas, hotels, or restaurants. [49] It applies to all goods and services 'which are available to the public and which are ofered outside the area of private and family life and the transactons carried out in this context'. [50] This means that a pricing decision taken by an algorithm in the framework of these actvites will generally come under the scope of antdiscriminaton law, since it concerns goods and services available to the public.
According to ant-discriminaton law, a pricing decision product of an algorithm will be discriminatory-and therefore prohibited-if it has been taken 'on the basis of' one of the prohibited grounds (direct discriminaton), or if it has a disproportonate impact on certain groups defned by a prohibited ground without an objectve and appropriate justfcaton (indirect discriminaton). [51] In other words, in order to comply with ant-discriminaton law, merchants ('controllers' for EU data protecton law) must ensure that certain data related to immutable characteristcs or fundamental choices of individuals are not used as the basis to take pricing decisions, and that those decisions do not have a disproportonate impact on certain groups without an adequate justfcaton. Direct discriminaton is linked to a more stringent regime, as it cannot in principle be justfed, whereas indirect discriminaton allows for more fexibility in terms of justfcaton.
For the purposes of this artcle, we focus on direct discriminaton as the most immediate type of discriminaton likely to emerge from pricing decisions taken by algorithms. Direct discriminaton applies to the situaton where personal data relatng to one or more of the prohibited grounds is embedded in the 'black box' of the algorithm, and is used to take a pricing decision. Even if this data linked to prohibited grounds is only used in part by the algorithm to determine the fnal outcome, that partal use will taint the decision with discriminaton, insofar as it will be considered as taken 'on the basis of' a prohibited ground.
However, indirect discriminaton is also conceivable in these situatons if an algorithm uses criteria which, although facially neutral and unrelated to any of the prohibited grounds, have a disproportonate impact on some protected groups without an adequate justfcaton. One could think, for example, of an online retail store using an algorithm to take pricing decisions on the basis of the user's browser agent. If a signifcant number of users in a specifc age bracket (say, 60+ years old users) use the same legacy web browser on dated computer equipment, and see higher prices as a consequence, a case might be made for indirect age discriminaton. However, indirect discriminaton cases will generally be less frequent and harder to prove than direct discriminaton cases.
At the EU level, discriminaton (both direct and indirect) in the access to goods and services is prohibited on the grounds of gender and of racial or ethnic origin. [52] For instance, if an algorithm establishes higher prices for women than men on account of the user's gender, this will be considered discriminatory. Although the Charter of Fundamental Rights forbids in its Artcle 21 any discriminaton 'based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetc features, language, religion or belief, politcal or any other opinion, membership of a natonal minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientaton', this provision does not extend the feld of applicaton of Union law, and cannot be used as such to expand the prohibiton of discriminaton in access to goods and services to other grounds.
The case of insurance premiums and benefts illustrates well this discussion. The Gender Goods and Services Directve explicitly mentons that 'the use of sex as a factor in the calculaton of premiums and benefts for the purposes of insurance and related fnancial services shall not result in diferences in individuals' premiums and benefts'. [53] Consequently, if an algorithm determines premiums and benefts on the basis of sex-even if this criterion is only used in part for that determinaton-, the resultng pricing decision will breach antdiscriminaton law. In the seminal case Test-Achats, the Court of Justce clarifed this prohibiton and confrmed that it is no longer allowed within the EU to treat male and female policyholders diferently when calculatng premiums and benefts for insurance contracts, and this on account of the principle of equality and non-discriminaton enshrined in Artcles 21 and 23 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. [54] It could be argued that this prohibiton extends, in the EU context, to racial or ethnic origin. According to the Race Equality Directve, discriminaton on the basis of racial or ethnic origin is also prohibited with regard to access to goods and services.
[55] A consistent interpretaton of EU law would lead us to the conclusion that racial or ethnic origin cannot either be a factor for the calculaton of premiums and benefts for the purposes of insurance and related fnancial services. In the words of Advocate General Kokot:
The Council may not therefore, for example, permit a person's race and ethnic origin to be used as a ground for diferentaton in insurance. In a Union governed by the rule of law, which has declared respect for human dignity, human rights, equality and non-discriminaton to be its overriding principles, it would without doubt be extremely inappropriate if for instance, in the context of medical insurance, varying risks of contractng skin cancers were to be linked to the skin colour of the insured person and either a higher or lower premium were thus to be demanded of him. [56] Pricing algorithms, as established above, afect the ability of individuals and groups to access goods and services. If the monetary cost incurred to access these goods or services is determined on the basis of gender or of racial or ethnic origin, that decision will consttute direct discriminaton under EU law, which is prohibited. This is especially relevant in the case of insurance, where algorithms ordinarily take into account actuarial factors in order to calculate premiums and benefts. [57] Moreover, natonal legal orders ofen extend this prohibiton of discriminaton in access to goods and services to cover additonal grounds, like a person's habits, place of residence, or even the partcular vulnerability resultng from their economic situaton. [58] In Belgium, for instance, discriminaton in access to goods and services is prohibited on account of nineteen criteria, among which natonal origin, disability, sexual orientaton, wealth, or health status. [59] This may lead to questoning the discriminatory dimensions of many pricing decisions taken by algorithms that would be otherwise not relevant from an ant-discriminaton law perspectve.
To sum up, EU ant-discriminaton law applies to pricing algorithms insofar as they have an impact on the access of individuals to goods and services. At the EU level, discriminaton in the access to goods and services is only prohibited with regard to racial or ethnic origin and gender, although natonal law may contain a more comprehensive protecton and include additonal grounds.
4. Data protecton law meets ant-discriminaton law: Commonalites, potental advantages of an integrated approach, misalignments 4.1 Commonalites of data protecton and ant-discriminaton law As this artcle ofers an analysis from both EU data protecton and ant-discriminaton law, it seems useful to consider whether these two felds of law share any concepts or have any clear interconnectons. Our research revealed three such 'obvious' intersectons: frst of all, the noton of fairness lies at the core of both data protecton and ant-discriminaton. [60] Secondly, the special protecton of certain elements revealing potental discriminaton features in both areas of law. For data protecton law these elements can be found in special categories of data, also called 'sensitve data'. [61] For ant-discriminaton law, these elements are embodied by prohibited grounds. There is a substantal overlap between these two categories. Finally, the special rules on automated decision-making in EU data protecton law clearly stem from discriminaton concerns.
Fairness
Fairness as a concept is hard to defne. From a data protecton perspectve, it is clear that within the EU the processing of personal data needs to be 'fair', [62] but it remains elusive what 'fair processing' actually entails. [63] A detailed analysis of this concept is far beyond the scope of this artcle. For our purposes, it sufces to say that fairness entails the noton that data subjects should be treated fairly. [64] As Cliford and Ausloos argue, this does not only mean that data subjects must not be deceived by the controller about what is happening with their personal data, but it also aims at counterbalancing the inherent imbalance in data protecton between data subject and controller in a more general manner. [65] Data protecton and ant-discriminaton law do not only share this inital aim of re-establishing fairness, they also go in similar ways about it. As Gellert et al. note in their comparison of data protecton and ant-discriminaton law within the EU, both areas of law stpulate legal principles and establish administratve bodies (data protecton authorites and equality bodies), as well as individual rights for the afected (data subject rights and access to justce rights). [66] A fnal commonality between ant-discriminaton and data protecton law achieved through the noton of fairness lies in the concept of 'fair balancing', which for Cliford and Ausloos forms one core string of fairness, and represents the need for necessity and proportonality to be examined when there is a clash with other fundamental rights. [67] This aspect of fairness was also pivotal when the CJEU discussed its so far only case mentoning [68] both data protecton and nondiscriminaton: Huber.
[69] In Huber, an Austrian living in Germany complained about his inclusion in a German database for foreigners that was much more comprehensive that any database on German natonals. In his complaint, he claimed that he had been discriminated against on the basis of natonality. The CJEU analysed the facts mainly from a data protecton angle, but considered discriminaton within the data protecton analysis when examining the necessity of the processing, which was 'interpreted in the light of the prohibiton on any discriminaton on grounds of natonality'. [70] In light of the above, we argue that data protecton and non-discriminaton are two fundamental rights working towards the same goal through the noton of fairness. Hence, unlike some other fundamental rights pairings, such as data protecton and freedom of expression, they do not require balancing but rather inform each other's interpretaton, as can be tentatvely seen in Huber.
Sensitve data and prohibited discriminaton grounds
Sensitve data are defned in Artcle 9(1) GDPR as so-called 'special categories of personal data'. It includes all personal data linked to racial or ethnic origin, politcal opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs or trade union membership, genetc data and biometric data if used to uniquely identfy a person, health data, and data concerning a person's sex life or sexual orientaton. The processing of sensitve data is in principle prohibited under EU data protecton law.
[71] Sensitve data are considered especially worthy of protecton due to their close connecton with various fundamental rights [72] and their high risk for potental discriminatory outcomes. [73] The WP29 considers that using such data in algorithms, such as those used for behavioural advertsing, poses a serious risk to the right to personal data protecton of individuals. [74] Due to this higher risk of discriminaton and violaton of other fundamental rights, EU data protecton law has always prescribed special rules for the processing of sensitve data, startng from the general prohibiton thereof. Taking the GDPR as the latest example of data protecton legislaton, while sensitve data require a specifc legitmate basis to be processed (just as nonsensitve personal data), these bases are more limited in their applicaton. The legitmate bases of Artcle 9(2) GDPR are therefore more strict compared to the ones enlisted in Artcle 6(1) GDPR, though overlaps can occur. [75] The protected categories for sensitve personal data according to Artcle 9(1) GDPR are from the outset similar to the protected grounds of EU ant-discriminaton law. [76] Diferences exist however, [77] considering that neither gender nor age are considered sensitve data in EU data protecton law. While age can in some instances be linked to health data and thus proft from the special protecton for sensitve data, the processing of data about gender will generally fall outside this special regime. This is especially unfortunate since gender is one of the two protected grounds on the basis of which EU ant-discriminaton law condemns discriminaton in the access to goods and services-the other ground being racial or ethnic origin. Combining the general prohibiton of processing sensitve data with the limited catalogue of exceptons for processing could lead to the conclusion that ant-discriminaton law and data protecton law are sufciently aligned. However, this is not the legal reality.
First, the limited catalogue of exceptons includes the explicit consent of the data subject, which is, according to Zuiderveen Borgesius and Poort, the only realistcally possible legitmate basis for the processing of sensitve data by a pricing algorithm. [78] Compared to the 'normal' consent of Artcle 6(1)(a) GDPR, 'explicit' consent requires that the consent specifcally relates to the fact that sensitve data are being processed. [79] In additon, the GDPR provides the opportunity for Member States and other Union legislatve acts to exclude certain forms of sensitve data processing from this legal basis. [80] While these precautons heighten the threshold for consent, they do not alleviate the fact that people readily consent away their (sensitve) data. [81] On the other hand, as Zuiderveen Borgesius and Poort note, due to the unpopularity of pricing algorithms their reliance on consent as a legitmate basis for the processing of sensitve data seems difcult in practce, should the data subject/consumer be aware of what is going on. [82] Second, as shown above, not all prohibited grounds represent at the same tme sensitve data. Hence, relying solely on the strict regime for sensitve data to protect individuals from discriminatory pricing algorithms would not be helpful in combatng discriminaton based on gender, and, potentally (at the natonal level), age.
To summarise, while the special legal regime for sensitve data-which is actually based on the heightened risk of discriminaton-ofers some protecton against discriminatory pricing algorithms, this does not per se ofer a satsfactory soluton. In any case, the fact that sensitve data are aforded stronger protecton because of the increased risk that they lead to discriminaton shows that the EU legislator acknowledges the interconnecton between data protecton and non-discriminaton. [83] 4.1.3 Automated decision-making and Artcle 22 GDPR Artcle 22 GDPR establishes a 'right' not to be subject to automated decision-making without any human interventon that results in legal efects or similar other efects for the data subject. The aim of this provision is explained in Recital 71 of the GDPR, which puts on the controller the obligaton to secure personal data in a manner that takes account of the potental risks involved for the interests and rights of the data subject and that prevents, inter alia, discriminatory efects on natural persons on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, politcal opinion, religion or belief, trade union membership, genetc or health status or sexual orientaton, or that result in measures having such an efect (emphasis added).
Artcle 22 is not an inventon of the GDPR, but was already included in the DPD with very similar wording but limited practcal success. [84] This unsuccessfulness can be partly atributed to the ambiguity of the formulaton of Artcle 15 DPD (unfortunately lef unchanged in Artcle 22 GDPR), [85] mentoning 'a right not to be subject to'. As Wachter et al. explain, this can be interpreted either as a prohibiton of solely automated decisions without human interventon to which controllers have to comply ex ante, or a subjectve data subject right (a sort of additonal right to object) that can be invoked by the concerned individual. [86] Naturally, the frst interpretaton ofers more protecton than the second, as it would not depend on any acton by the data subject. [87] While the GDPR also stpulates a right not to be subject to, contnuing the confusion of Artcle 15 DPD, the WP29 clearly states in its guidance on Artcle 22 that 'the term "right" in the provision does not mean that Artcle 22(1) applies only when actvely invoked by the data subject. Artcle 22(1) establishes a general prohibiton for decision-making based solely on automated processing'. [88] Unfortunately, the guidance provided by the WP29 is not binding, so it will be up for the CJEU to authoritatvely decide what Artcle 22 exactly entails. [89] More problems stem from the scope of applicaton of Artcle 22, which includes only decisions 'based solely on automated processing […] which [produce] legal efects concerning him or her or signifcantly [afect] him or her'. [90] The fact that Artcle 22 GDPR refers to a 'solely automated decision' could be interpreted as meaning that any type of human interventon renders the provision inapplicable. [91] However, according to Voigt and von dem Bussche human involvement can only be considered when it is connected to decision-making powers; in other words, the human involved must be able to infuence the content of the fnal outcome. [92] This interpretaton was confrmed by the WP29. [93] Further issues are created by the conditon that the automated decision must produce legal or similarly signifcant efects. According to some authors, this conditon means that Artcle 22 GDPR only applies for example, in the context of pricing, when algorithms lead to signifcantly higher monetary costs for the data subject (hence not for reductons or small diferences in pricing). [94] As the GDPR does not specify these legal or similar efects, much will again depend on the interpretaton of the CJEU. For other authors, it seems likely that the provision of Artcle 22 GDPR will apply to most pricing algorithms: for instance, 'price discriminaton' is listed as an example by Malgieri and Comandé. [95] This opinion is also shared by the WP29, which considers both the 'afectng of someone's fnancial circumstances such as their eligibility to credit' and the 'automatc refusal of a credit applicaton' as examples for legal or similarly signifcant efects. [96] Artcle 22 GDPR also includes a special regime with regard to the processing of sensitve data.
According to Artcle 22(4) GDPR this 'right' concerning automated individual decision-making is always applicable if sensitve data are being processed. Artcle 22 GDPR therefore entails a general prohibiton of automated decision-making based on sensitve data, following the WP29 guidance. [97] This prohibiton knows only two exceptons: when the processing of the sensitve data was based on explicit consent and when the processing was based on a substantal public interest. Recital 71 highlights that 'automated decision-making and profling based on special categories of personal data should be allowed only under specifc conditons'. However, even if one of these two exceptons apply, the processing can only take place with 'suitable measures' securing the data subject's rights and freedoms. [98] According to Malgieri and Comandé those measures include at least the right to obtain human interventon and the right to contest the decision. [99] It follows therefrom that if Artcle 22 GDPR contains indeed a general prohibiton of processing sensitve data for automated decision-making, and pricing algorithms fall within its concept of an automated decision producing legal or similarly signifcant efects, that provision could be a substantal protecton against discriminatory pricing algorithms. We however consider that due to the large ambiguites regarding the functon and scope of Artcle 22 GDPR, and while this provision refects promising interconnectons of non-discriminaton and data protecton, it currently fails to properly accommodate this link.
[100]
Potental advantages of an integrated approach
As it can be gathered from the previous sectons, neither EU data protecton law nor EU antdiscriminaton law alone seem to provide complete protecton against pricing algorithms discriminatng on the basis of protected grounds. Although commonalites between both legal regimes exist, this overlap does not extend to all situatons. This is unsatsfactory, considering that both data protecton and non-discriminaton are considered fundamental rights at the EU level. Both of these rights call into queston the supposed neutrality of certain algorithms, and highlight the fact that fawed informaton and bias can be hidden behind certain pricing decisions. In this secton we explore areas where using a more integrated combinaton of EU data protecton and ant-discriminaton law could represent a way forward. Such a combinaton would be especially fruitul in cases where EU ant-discriminaton law stretches beyond the limitatons of EU data protecton law, and vice-versa.
Data protecton law ofers transparency tools that facilitate proof of discriminaton
As explained above, a pricing decision taken 'on the basis of' one of the prohibited grounds stated in EU ant-discriminaton law will consttute direct discriminaton. In our view, the process of making a claim of discriminaton can be facilitated by one of the cornerstones of EU data protecton law, namely EU data subject rights.
Data subject rights in EU data protecton law aim to overcome the concerns linked to problems of transparency, which will also be present whenever pricing algorithms are involved. [101] Data subject rights secure the individual's right to have a voice in data processing about him or her. [102] The data subject rights of relevance for discriminatory pricing algorithms are those contributng to enhanced transparency, namely the right to informaton (Artcles 13 and 14 GDPR) and the right of access (Artcle 15 GDPR). [103] The GDPR introduced important clarifcatons with regard to the right to informaton of the data subject. Artcles 13 and 14 prescribe that the data subject shall be informed ex ante 'about the existence of automated decision-making, including profling', and that they need to receive meaningful informaton about 'the logic involved, as well as the signifcance and the envisaged consequences of such processing'. [104] This is in line with the data protecton principle of transparency, and should encompass nearly all pricing algorithms since, as we argued, they can be considered profling by automated means since they rely to a certain extent on personal data of the individual. [105] As a consequence, such pricing algorithms not involving profling (e.g. pricing algorithms for the stock market, which calculate the worth of a specifc stock at a specifc tme) would not be included as long as they do not also involve some assessment of, for example, price sensitvites on the side of the prospectve buyer, which again would require a certain amount of profling (including insights on past price sensitvity, job, income, family situaton, etc.). [106] The right of access is meant as a tool for data subjects to verify the fairness and transparency of data processing concerning them. [107] Compared to the informaton rights of the data subject, it is a right to be used ex post, afer the processing has occurred. [108] Artcle 15(1) GDPR lists under (h) an informaton obligaton, meaning that an access request in the context of a pricing algorithm must be accompanied by informaton about the workings of the algorithm and possible consequences for the data subject.
While the amount of informaton that needs to be ofered under Artcles 13, 14, and 15 GDPR is heavily debated, even under the most restrictve view it is clear that some meaningful guidance on the workings of the algorithm must be included, even if it is more generic. [109] This could mean, for example, that an individual subject to credit scoring receives informaton on what datasets are considered positvely and what datasets are considered negatvely for his or her credit rate. This is comparable to law students receiving a grading scheme before an exam in order to be able to roughly assess what kind of answers will be graded in what way. While this can never guarantee a full predicton of the outcome, it can help the individual understand why the outcome is how it is. Such informaton could be sufcient to help prove discriminaton if, for instance, it is shown that part-tme work or a certain age are being used as negatve factors. [110] An integrated approach, in the sense of using these transparency rights to uncover discriminaton, ofers several opportunites. While ant-discriminaton law is beter equipped to address the wrong that occurs when algorithmic decisions on pricing are based on protected grounds, EU data protecton law ofers the tools needed to reveal that discriminatory practce. Data subject rights, such as the right to informaton and the right of access, could thus play an important role in obtaining evidence establishing that a decision by an algorithm is based on protected grounds. Moreover, since Artcle 80 GDPR now ofers the possibility for data subjects to entrust their rights to a non-proft, organisaton, or associaton, the door seems to be open for equality bodies to make use of data subject rights on behalf of victms of discriminaton. We believe that such a combined approach could prove very successful in the future.
The use of proxies in data protecton and ant-discriminaton law
A second area where ant-discriminaton law and data protecton law could beneft from an integrated approach concerns proxies. We have discussed the situaton whereby a merchant (controller) uses sensitve personal data related to prohibited discriminaton grounds to take pricing decisions via an algorithm. However, what happens if a merchant (controller) does not process sensitve personal data, but uses the complex set of informaton they possess about a partcular person to infer sensitve personal data? Many parameters can be used as a proxy for a prohibited discriminaton ground. For instance, a company may aggregate data such as the street or neighbourhood where individuals live and the type of products they consume to determine their racial or ethnic origin. [111] As long as a decision is ultmately taken 'on the basis of' one of the prohibited grounds, this will consttute direct discriminaton under ant-discriminaton law. For instance, it has been shown how some mortgage lenders rejected loan applicatons or determined interest rates on the basis of the racial or ethnic origin of the applicants. This practce is known as redlining. As a result, black and Hispanic applicants were rejected or charged signifcantly higher rates than white applicants in the US. [112] Similar practces have also been documented in the European context. [113] Ofen, these decisions did not rely on the racial or ethnic origin of the applicants as such, but rather on the racial or ethnic origin of the majority of inhabitants in the partcular neighbourhood or area where the applicants lived. In other words, an algorithm aggregated data concerning racial or ethnic origin as well as property values and other neighbourhood metrics, and provided a decision to accept or reject a loan or to set interest rates at a partcular level. This decision, however, had been partly taken on the basis of racial or ethnic origin.
It is important to clarify that in these cases that the decision to reject an applicant or to charge higher interest rates will be considered direct discriminaton. In the context of EU law, it is clear that direct discriminaton will occur whenever a decision is taken on the basis of the origin of the majority of the inhabitants in a neighbourhood, even if the partcular individual afected is not of the same origin. The Court of Justce clarifed as much in the CHEZ case, statng that, even if the applicant in the partcular case was not of Roma origin, 'it is indeed Roma origin, in this instance that of most of the other inhabitants of the district in which she carries on her business, which consttutes the factor on the basis of which she considers that she has sufered less favourable treatment or a partcular disadvantage'.
[114]
The treatment of proxies for sensitve data is similar in data protecton law. On the basis of the sheer amount of personal data algorithms have at their disposal, proxies are likely to be found and used. [115] According to the EDPS, this leads to the risk that 'highly sensitve data […] can be predicted from seemingly non-sensitve informaton, such as […] key stroke dynamics'. [116] So far, the CJEU has been very strict about sensitve data and applied the special, more stringent regime to cases where proxies have been used, [117] allowing for the assessment that at least clear proxies for sensitve data are not sufcient to avoid the special safeguards EU data protecton law foresees.
Combining the CJEU's strong stance on proxies in both areas could lead to even stronger protecton against pricing algorithms. Additonally, both disciplines could rely on each other when trying to defne the diference between a prohibited proxy and a nonrelated data item, which could potentally lead to inferences similar to proxies, depending on the means used.
[118] We believe that a streamlining of legal regimes could alleviate the major evidentary issue that the use of proxies reveals: proving when they have efectvely been used. [119] 4.2.3 Ant-discriminaton law as a means to counterbalance data protecton's heavy reliance on consent As we have explained so far, EU data protecton law includes safeguards and opens potental venues to address discriminaton by pricing algorithms. These safeguards include the more stringent regime of protecton for sensitve data and the potental general prohibiton of automated decision-making without human interventon based on sensitve data. However, for both provisions consent is an excepton and, unfortunately, consent has proven to be less of an insurmountable barrier in the past, as data subjects tend to consent without reading the details. [120] The faw from a data protecton perspectve for protectng individuals against discriminaton by pricing algorithms thus lays in the heavy reliance of its remedies on consent.
[121] While a motvated individual could use data protecton tools to uncover discriminaton, 'passive' individuals will not enjoy the same amount of protecton in practce. Artcle 80 GDPR could be of some help here, as it introduces the possibility to 'mandate a not-for-proft body, organisaton or associaton' with the exercise of the rights of the data subject. In this regard, some authors have suggested that third partes such as governments or NGOs could hold sensitve data related to prohibited grounds to facilitate this task. [122] Another possibility would be developing 'sof' policy initatves such as certfcates or labels to indicate to users whether their sensitve data are being used to determine pricing or to take other important commercial decisions. However, in the end all these tools rely on a certain actve engagement of the individuals concerned.
The heavy reliance on consent and the 'privacy paradox', leading individuals to consent to diferent kinds of processing without knowing the details while at the same tme being generally concerned about privacy and data protecton, could be to a certain extent counterbalanced by ant-discriminaton law. The injury of being potentally discriminated against based on a protected ground can lead to more awareness and a greater percepton of injustce in individuals, who might therefore pay closer atenton and use the tools data protecton law provides them with. [123] 4.3 Misalignments between data protecton and ant-discriminaton law As a fnal point in this secton, it is important to note some misalignments of current antdiscriminaton law and data protecton law that we found in our research. First, it is sometmes argued that the detecton of discriminatory bias in algorithms can only occur via the processing of sensitve data. [124] Especially Zarsky highlights that algorithms can only be tested for some types of discriminaton by using sensitve data. [125] Ant-discriminaton law scholars have similarly shown that the availability of such data is key to developing non-discriminatory policies and practces. [126] This raises the queston whether such processing of special categories of personal data is permited under the EU data protecton regime.
Arguably, such processing for the general testng of algorithms could be permissible under either Artcle 9(2)(g) GDPR as 'processing that is necessary for reasons of substantal public interest, on the basis of Union or Member State law', or Artcle 9(2)(j) GDPR as 'processing necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientfc or historical research purposes or statstcal purposes […] based on Union or Member State law'. Both would require further legislatve steps by either the Member States or the EU. [127] For specifc legal claims about discriminaton through a pricing algorithm, Artcle 9(2)(f) could be the appropriate legal basis for the preparaton of the legal claim for the court proceedings. [128] This legitmate basis is however only suitable for individuals preparing a concrete court acton, and not for generally testng potental discriminaton via pricing algorithms. None of the mentoned legal bases seems therefore obvious for general testng, especially when no individual has been previously afected. [129] Another important respect in which EU data protecton and ant-discriminaton law are misaligned is the relatonship between the categories of sensitve data and prohibited discriminaton grounds. Even if these two categories overlap for the most part, certain grounds, in partcular gender and age, are not in principle considered as sensitve data. As mentoned above, this misalignment risks creatng gaps in protecton from discriminaton, both as regards the data protecton provisions on sensitve data and the safeguards against automated decision-making contained in Artcle 22 GDPR. While there is no easy soluton to this misalignment, [130] we hope that future research will more clearly elaborate on the link between sensitve data and discriminaton
Conclusions
All things considered, it must be emphasised that the key issue here is that goods and services should be allocated to anyone willing or able to pay their price, and not according to personal circumstances. In other words, diferent treatment on the basis of diferent purchasing power is not the same as diferent treatment on the basis of data-driven judgments about who users are. [131] Generally, both ant-discriminaton and data protecton law concern themselves with discriminatory pricing algorithms and include them in their scope of applicaton. However, on their own, neither provides adequate protecton. A combined approach seems therefore necessary. [132] Our research shows that, unlike many other fundamental rights, there is in principle no confict or balancing required between data protecton and non-discriminaton. Quite the opposite: both seem to serve the same master of fairness, and are compatble and interlinked in their applicaton and concepts. The core problem, in our opinion, lies not in any discrepancies between these two felds of law, but rather in the lack of an integrated legal regime.
As we have explained, using data protecton tools in non-discriminaton cases could be an efectve way of satsfying the evidentary threshold. Additonally, more streamlining on the legal treatment of proxies is needed. Finally, discriminaton could help make individuals pay more atenton to data protecton issues, since most data protecton safeguards currently rely on consent and/or the actve engagement of the data subject. However, the integraton of ant-discriminaton and data protecton law is not completely seamless, as there remain some misalignments.
Overall, we believe that due to the many shared values, an integrated approach towards antdiscriminaton and data protecton law would be capable of providing enhanced protecton against discriminatory pricing algorithms. This is independent from the 'chicken-or-egg' queston of whether pricing algorithms are essentally a data protecton or a non-discriminaton issue. We put forward that they are both. For strategic reasons, it might sometmes make more sense to approach a pricing algorithm from a data protecton angle, as the scope of EU data protecton law is wider and the evidentary threshold lower, but even then any analysis cannot do without serious consideraton of ant-discriminaton law.
In the end, non-discriminaton may be considered as an essental dimension to secure the fundamental right to data protecton of individuals. Data protecton cases involving pricing algorithms will ofen raise questons in terms of potentally discriminatory efects. At the same tme, the efectveness of ant-discriminaton law is bolstered by data protecton law, in partcular through the additonal tools and safeguards it foresees. These two disciplines provide a combined answer to those situatons where, unlike in the popular TV entertainment show, the price is not quite right.
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